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SPANISH COMPANY FOREIGN MARKET ENTRY 
Felipe Ruiz and Francisco J. Mas 
 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the determinants of diversification mode 
(acquisition versus greenfield) through foreign direct investment considering various 
theories, such as those of mergers and acquisitions, transaction costs, the learning 
organisation, the institutional context of the company and the cultural environment of 
the host country, and to analyse the determinants of entry mode combining 
diversification mode with ownership structure decision (greenfield wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, greenfield joint ventures, full acquisition and partial acquisition) and 
proposing various research hypotheses. The methodology used estimates various 
binomial and multinomial logit models, over a sample of 141 Spanish manufacturing 
companies between 1998 and 2000, finding that entry mode into a foreign country 
through direct investment is mainly explained by related diversification, international 
and local experience, advertising intensity, cultural distance, company size and 
ownership structure. 




El propósito de este trabajo consiste en analizar, por un lado, los determinantes 
del modo de diversificación (adquisición versus desarrollo interno) de la inversión 
directa en el exterior considerando diversas aproximaciones teóricas, como las de 
fusiones y adquisiciones, costes de transacción, del aprendizaje organizativo, así como 
del contexto institucional de la empresa y del entorno cultural del país receptor. Por otro 
lado, se examinan los determinantes de la inversión directa exterior combinando el 
modo de diversificación con la estructura de la propiedad empresarial (adquisición total, 
adquisición parcial, filial de plena propiedad y filial de propiedad compartida) 
proponiendo diversas hipótesis de investigación. La metodología aplicada estima 
diversos modelos logit, binomial y multinomial, sobre 141 empresas españolas 
manufactureras entre 1998 y 2000, detectando que el modo de entrada mediante 
inversión directa exterior viene explicada por la diversificación relacionada, la 
experiencia internacional y local de la empresa, la intensidad publicitaria, la distancia 
cultural, así como por el tamaño y estructura de la propiedad de la empresa. 
Palabras clave: marketing internacional, modo de entrada, inversión directa en 
el exterior, joint-venture, adquisición.   3
1. Introduction 
International expansion is a business decision triggered by, amongst other 
things, the saturation of current markets, opportunities in other markets that can be 
exploited through the company’s resources or competitive reactions to similar 
movements by competitors (Ramsler, 1982). Also, entry into a foreign market entails 
important decisions on the country/countries involved and the sequence and mode of 
entry. In particular, the decision on the entry mode constitutes a fundamental aspect of 
international marketing (Bradley and Gannon, 2000) and implies a determination of the 
structural nature of a company’s operations in the target country (Osland et al, 2001), 
insofar as entry modes differ with respect to the degree of company control over the 
foreign operation, the resources assigned and the potential profits to be taken (Caves, 
1982; Bradley and Gannon, 2000). Entry modes such as exports and licensing are 
associated with lower levels of risk and of control over the marketing and operational 
strategies of the expansion. Conversely, entry modes which require foreign direct 
investment (FDI) allow greater control
1 but they bring with them additional risk (Taylor 
et al., 2000).
  As far as FDI is concerned, a company must consider two dimensions 
(Hennart and Park, 1993; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998): the establishment mode of 
the FDI that is denominated as diversification mode by Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) 
and, the ownership structure of the investment.  
i) The diversification mode
2 of the FDI, distinguish the pure strategies (Barkema 
and Vermeulen, 1998) of acquiring a local company (acquisition) and creating a new 
subsidiary (also being known as greenfield, de novo or internal development 
investment). In other words, companies should opt for purchasing at least part of the 
equity of an existing company with established resources in a foreign market
3 or setting 
up a subsidiary from scratch. In either case, authors like Hennart and Park (1993), 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) and Brouthers and Brouthers (2000), hold that there is no 
                                                 
1 FDI gives a company stable and effective participation and influence over management (Durán, 1999), due to the 
fact that the process implies the management of production plants or distribution centres located in at least two 
countries which gives the company its multinational character (Caves, 1996). 
2 See Slangen and Hennart (2001) for a broader review of the literature on this decision.  
3 This aspect has also been studied in the context of national expansion, known as internal growth or acquisition. Its 
determinants are market structure and the characteristics of the company (Yip, 1982).   4
coherent theoretical development with respect to the determinants which affect the choice 
of diversification mode (acquisition versus greenfield investment) for foreign market 
entry.  
The transaction costs theory, known as the theory of internalisation (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982), analyses the characteristics of a transaction in order to 
choose the most efficient entry method (high transaction costs favour 
internationalisation from within the company, i.e. through subsidiaries), thus benefiting 
from imperfections in the market
4 due to the presence of differences in national 
resources (Hennart and Park, 1993; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). However, Brouthers 
and Brouthers (2000), based on suggestions made by Robins (1987) and Kogut and Singh 
(1988), consider that the transaction costs theory is insufficient to fully explain the choice 
of diversification mode. Therefore, they propose a combination of the above theory and 
contributions from the institutional context of the company
5 and from the cultural context
6 
                                                 
4 Imperfections of the market constitute the fundamental element of the transaction costs theory, which originates 
from the work of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1981). Essentially, a multinational company has various 
advantages known as “excess resources” (Chatterjee, 1990), which come from intermediate markets (human 
resources, raw materials, information, etc.) and, especially, from intangible assets like know-how and experience. The 
motivation to enter foreign markets comes from the possibility of exploiting these advantages efficiently and 
benefiting from the differences between different national markets (Madhok, 1997). The specific nature of a 
company’s advantages is a fundamental factor when determining whether it should enter a foreign market by means 
of acquisition or greenfield investment. A company is more likely to choose greenfield investment when the specific 
advantages it wishes to exploit abroad are difficult to separate from the company’s organisation and are intrinsic to its 
workforce (Hennart and Park, 1993). In this way, it assures itself of exclusivity and control over its specific 
advantages. On the other hand, a company is more likely to opt for the acquisition of an existing company in the 
target market when its specific advantages are easily separable from the organisation or simply when it does not have 
the specific advantages or resources necessary to enter the market and they would be difficult or impossible to 
develop in the short term (Hennart and Park, 1993). In this way, the company gains access to resources which 
substitute their greenfield investment (Hitt et al., 1996), although it incurs the additional costs or premiums which 
come with acquisitions as well as management costs deriving from the integration of the new company into the 
company structure and the fact that it may acquire more assets than it needs . (López and García, 1998a). 
5 The institutional context of a company, also known as organisational capabilities (Madhok, 1997, 1998), is 
motivated, not only by the exploitation of the existing capabilities of each company, thus benefiting from market 
imperfections (upheld by the transaction costs theory), but also by the increment or development of capabilities 
(Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000); including both the intangible (capabilities) and the tangible (resources) of the 
company which become a source of competitive advantages or disadvantages. This means that, the institutional 
context broadens the focus of cost minimisation (of transaction) to also incorporate the management of the value of 
assets (Madhok, 1997). Basically, this theory considers a company as a basket of abilities and knowledge where 
skills, organisation, and technology are interrelated, so that its management represents a dynamic process or of 
routines in which information management is fundamental (company skills of acquiring, evaluating, assimilating, 
integrating, diffusing, deploying and exploiting knowledge) in order to extend its international activities (Madhok, 
1998). The main consideration when determining the entry mode comes from the compatibility between existing 
company practices and those needed to succeed in a certain market. So, internationalisation through subsidiaries gives 
an advantage when the company has solid knowledge and the necessary practices for implementation costs to be low; 
whereas a company prefers to integrate its knowledge with that of others when it lacks the necessary abilities as 
learning in the new contexts would be discouraging in terms of costs and time.   5
of the target countries. The learning organisation theory
7 (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 
1991) also allows an analysis of the choice of diversification mode of a multinational 
based on the role of product and market diversity in the development of knowledge and 
technological capability through learning and experience (Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998). Finally, the theory of mergers and acquisitions has explored the preference for 
acquisitions over mergers (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987), making it transferable to 
choice of diversification mode (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
ii) From the perspective of the ownership structure of the FDI, we can 
distinguish between full and partial control of subsidiaries (Stopford and Wells, 1972; 
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1988, 
1991; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Azofra and Martínez, 
1999; Pla, 1999) according to whether a company expands alone (as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary) or with partners (joint venture
8), respectively. The justification for joint 
ownership comes, from the point of view of transaction costs, from the possession of 
too few or inappropriate assets to enter a foreign country (Hennart and Park, 1993). This 
shortfall is often of tactical assets (knowledge of the market, distribution networks or 
the particular needs of local clients) and is, therefore, difficult to transfer or be 
generated within the company (López and García, 1998a). Recently, authors such as 
Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998), Delios and Beamish (1999) and Brouthers (2002) have 
also justified this focus of ownership structure, extending the transaction costs theory 
with the institutional context of the company and the culture of the country. 
                                                                                                                                               
6 The cultural context of a country (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Robins, 1987; Kogut and Singh, 1988) helps to 
define the potential profits and/or risks associated with a specific entry mode. Cultural context has an effective 
influence on a multinational’s entry mode due to the impact of the environment on assigned resources and strategic 
flexibility (Hill et al., 1990).  
7 The learning organisation theory considers that a company operating in diverse national settings and product 
settings can develop its technological capabilities, given that these new markets bring to the company new consumer 
needs and new possibilities for testing its technology. However, learning and the creation of capabilities, consequence 
of this variety of markets, is subject to organisational limits to the joint use of information. In this way, companies 
with superior technological capability are less inclined towards acquisitions instead of greenfield investments in the 
following situations (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998): i) when existing companies have little to offer in terms of 
technological skills; ii) if the acquiring company has superior technological capability, it could be difficult or 
impossible to transfer this capability into the acquired companies because of organisational inertia (which impedes 
the adaptation to new technological practices as this requires the acquired company to learn new organisational rules, 
procedures, conventions and strategies -Levitt and March, 1988-) 
8 A joint venture is defined as an independent organisation created through financial and other contributions from the 
companies concerned and which carries out one or more of the activities of interest of these companies (Rialp and 
Rialp, 1996). Each entity shares the ownership, management, risks and profits of the newly formed entity (Osland et 
al, 2001).   6
However, only the studies of Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) and López and 
García (2002a) have considered the combination of both points of view (diversification 
mode and ownership structure), analysing the determinants of the four alternatives of 
FDI
9: the full acquisition of an already existing company in the foreign market, the 
partial acquisition of a company, which is sufficient to confer control to the acquiring 
company, the wholly-owned subsidiary through greenfield investment, and the creation 
of a shared ownership new subsidiary through greenfield investment (the latter being 
known as joint venture) (Kogut and Singh, 1988). Basically, this line of research 
provides empirical evidence on the determinants of FDI (four entry options), but 
without an argumentation with a research hypothesis.  
Unlike previous studies, the aim of this work is twofold; firstly an analysis of the 
determinants of diversification mode (acquisition versus greenfield investment) 
considering various theoretical approaches such as transaction costs, the learning 
organisation, mergers and acquisitions, the institutional context of the company and the 
cultural context of the countries involved. Secondly, we examine the determinants of 
FDI by combining diversification mode with the structure of business ownership (full 
acquisition, partial acquisition, wholly-owned subsidiary and joint venture subsidiary) 
and proposing various research hypotheses. The empirical analysis is made on a sample 
of 252 foreign entries through FDI by 141 Spanish companies. The remainder of this 
paper is organised in the following way: the second section proposes and discusses 
various research hypotheses on the determinants of the entry mode in international 
markets. Section three presents the structure of the study that justifies the sample, 
methodology and variables used. The results are given in the fourth section and finally, 
the conclusions are shown. 
                                                 
9  Kogut and Singh (1988) and Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) analyse the joint-venture (which includes the 
ownership structure) as a third option to those of acquisition and subsidiary creation (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). 
Alternatively, López and García (2002b) distinguish between joint venture, partial and total acquisition. Finally, a 
third line of research considers that diversification mode and ownership structure are sequential decisions faced by a 
company that wishes to enter foreign markets (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995); which has been analysed in our country 
by López and García (1998a) from the transaction costs theory, finding a first stage choice between a fully owned 
subsidiary and investment which combines the abilities of a company with the resources of others. Those companies 
that choose the latter option have the option, in a second stage, of choosing between a joint venture, total acquisition 
or partial acquisition of a company in the target market.   7
2.  Research hypotheses on the determinants of foreign entry mode 
Literature on foreign entry mode examines its determinant factors based on a 
theoretical structure in which mergers and acquisitions, transaction costs, the learning 
organisation, the institutional context of the company and the cultural context of the 
country intervene. Amongst other factors, the following stand out, distinguishing its 
impact on diversification mode and on the four alternatives of combining diversification 
mode and ownership structure decision: 
2.1.  Hypotheses relative to diversification mode (acquisition versus 
greenfield). 
  A) Company-level factors 
i) Product diversification 
Concerning to product diversification, Industrial Organization Economy uses the 
degree of diversification in terms of the number of products or different industries in 
which the company operates, while Strategic Management considers diversification type 
according to whether a company moves towards similar business (related) or not 
(unrelated). 
ia) Degree of product diversification 
From the transaction costs theory, Hennart and Park (1993) affirm that 
companies with a high degree of product diversification prefer expansion through 
acquisition as they have developed sophisticated management control systems (specific 
advantages of the investing company which are implicit in the high level decision 
makers, and therefore, compatible with locally managed quasi-independent subsidiaries) 
which can be exploited through foreign acquisitions and, in this way, provide 
organisational efficiency (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Moreover, companies which 
have diversified by acquiring other companies could have developed abilities from 
acquisitions and, consequently prefer them (Yip, 1982; Zejan, 1990; Wilson, 1980) 
because they allow them to reduce the incremental cost of merger transactions (Caves 
and Mehra, 1986). Less diversified companies may not have developed these skills from 
acquisition or management control, so they would prefer greenfield investments. 
However, Rapp (1993) indicates that companies which mainly have intra-industry FDI’s   8
(as opposed to inter-industry FDI’s) tend to consider the need to acquire new 
technology less than modernising existing technology or establishing new markets for 
existing products. Along this line, Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) postulate that in these 
situations a relatively well diversified company prefers a greenfield entry to an 
acquisition, as this allows it to exploit existing technology. In other words, the parent 
company developed relevant technology before the FDI, so that it is more interested in 
transferring organisational routines to the new markets, which can be achieved at lower 
costs through greenfield investment. 
In any case, this linear relationship (positive or negative) between product 
diversification and choice of diversification mode has not obtained conclusive results. 
Because of this, Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), from the learning organisation theory, 
suggest a curvilinear relationship between product diversification and propensity 
towards greenfield investment as opposed to acquisition. Basically, Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998) suggest a curvilinear relationship (an inverted U-shape) between 
product diversification and technological capabilities, in such a way that technological 
capabilities initially grow to a certain level of diversification, to later decrease when 
they exceed the threshold. This is due to the fact that greater diversification is associated 
with organisational problems in the structure of the company that reduce shared 
information. These authors also affirm that a company’s level of technological 
capability is related to its probability of expanding through greenfield investment. 
Bearing in mind these arguments, Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) conclude that we can 
expect a curvilinear relationship (an inverted U-shape) between product diversification 
and propensity towards expansion through greenfield investment. In any case, the 
ambiguity found in literature on evaluating the influence of the degree of product 
diversification on diversification mode, has led to three competitive hypotheses: 
H1a: The greater the investing company’s degree of product diversification, the 
greater the probability of entry through acquisition. 
H1b: The greater the investing company’s degree of product diversification, the 
greater the probability of entry through greenfield investment. 
H1c: There is a curvilinear relationship (an inverted U-shape) between product 
diversification and its propensity towards expansion through greenfield 
investment.   9
ib) Product relatedness 
The product relatedness refers to the degree to which the subsidiary’s product 
line differs from the established activities of the parent company; in other words, 
whether the new subsidiary leads to similar business (related diversification) or not 
(unrelated diversification), with the object of showing the possibility of exploiting 
synergies between the businesses (Grant et al., 1988). However, there is no consensus 
on its impact on diversification mode. According to the transaction costs theory, 
greenfield investments are better for capturing synergies of related diversification in 
order to transfer knowledge or specific technologies (Andersson and Svensson, 1994); 
and, conversely, when a company diversifies in unrelated products it will have to obtain 
knowledge specific to the product (marketing or production know-how), which can be 
more efficiently gained through acquisitions (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Zejan, 1990; 
Hennart and Park, 1993; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). In this second case, the risk to 
the parent company is greater, which constitutes an incentive to pay the premium for 
acquisition and therefore reduce this risk. In the same way, learning organisation theory 
suggests that when a company makes a related expansion it has the possibility of 
transferring technological capabilities and its own routines through greenfield 
investment, whereas if the expansion is made into unfamiliar business areas, it must 
acquire the necessary technological capabilities of an already existing company and it 
would be difficult or impossible to use their current routines (Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998). Conversely, research of mergers and acquisitions, which debates the problems of 
the integration of the new entity by the investor (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1981), shows 
that differences in business culture are larger when the acquiring and acquired 
companies are from different industries. Therefore, Hennart and Park (1993) propose 
that the post-acquisition problems of interaction increase, thus reducing the probability 
of entry through acquisition (and favouring the creation of subsidiaries) when the entry 
represents an unrelated diversification for the investor. Faced with this lack of 
consensus, we propose the two following competitive hypotheses: 
H2a: The greater the investing company’s product relatedness, the greater the 
probability of entry through greenfield investment.  
H2b: The greater the investing company’s product relatedness, the greater the 
probability of entry through acquisition.   10
ii) R&D intensity 
Technological abilities are related to invention and innovatory ability with 
respect to investments made in R&D (Andersson and Svensson, 1994). This variable 
has been widely studied in empirical literature by various theories, reaching similar 
conclusions. The learning organisation theory holds that companies with a high level of 
R&D intensity are inclined towards greenfield investment instead of acquisition in the 
following two situations: i) companies in the host market have few technological skills; 
and ii) the acquiring company has superior technological capabilities, as it can be 
difficult or impossible to transfer them into the acquired company due to organisational 
inertia (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998)
10. Both the theories of transaction costs and 
institutional context consider that R&D intensity represents a specific advantage 
(obtained with sophisticated team management practices or with careful staff selection 
and training) for the investing company which, at the moment of the FDI, should be 
retained with investment through greenfield investment (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; 
Hennart and Park, 1993), due to the few opportunities to disseminate the company’s 
specific advantages and to the ease of implanting organisational technologies in 
greenfield investments as opposed to their imposition on the existing personnel 
(Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Conversely, companies without R&D intensity prefer 
to enter a foreign market through the acquisition of an existing company that gives it 
technological capabilities which, according to Andersson and Svensson (1994), are not 
produced instantly but accumulate over long periods of time. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H3a: The greater the investing company’s R&D intensity, the greater the 
probability of entry through greenfield investment. 
iii) Advertising intensity 
The impact of advertising intensity on the choice of diversification mode has 
received little attention in literature and no conclusive proposal has been reached. 
Basically, advertising intensity can be considered as a proxy for the investing 
company’s potential commercial assets and its knowledge of marketing in the market it 
operates in. Hennart and Park (1993), from the transaction costs theory, affirm that 
                                                 
10 An alternative view suggests that R&D intensive companies which lack knowledge of the host market could 
acquire it through acquisition (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Kogut and Singh, 1988). However, this alternative has not 
been empirically supported to date (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000).   11
marketing knowledge is a specific advantage of the investing company that can be 
separated from the organisation and incorporated, usually successfully, into another 
company. Moreover, acquisition allows the foreign entrant to acquire local brands and 
combine them with their specific marketing abilities. Because of this, advertising 
intensity is more easily associated with entry through acquisition (and less so with 
subsidiaries) especially at mature sectors where the possession of a commercial brand 
constitutes an important asset and if cultural and language differences reduce the 
benefits of using the original brand in the new market (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
However, Caves and Mehra (1986) and Kogut and Singh (1988) do not predict any sign 
in this causal relationship as acquisition in industries characterised by high promotional 
costs allows the exploitation of advantages of the available distribution system and host 
market knowledge, although Caves y Mehra (1986) affirm that acquisition could be 
unattractive when a multinational transfers its own product differentiation abilities 
(brand). Due to this lack of consensus, we propose the following competitive 
hypotheses: 
H4a: The greater the investing company’s advertising intensity, the greater the 
probability of entry through greenfield investment. 
H4b: The greater the investing company’s advertising intensity, the greater the 
probability of entry through acquisition. 
iv) International experience 
The impact of a company’s international experience on the choice of 
diversification mode is not very clear (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). From the point of 
view of the learning organisation theory, Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) argue that 
experience is an important source of learning for organisations (Penrose, 1959) and that, 
in different circumstances, it increases the variety of ideas and incidents to which the 
company is exposed (Huber, 1991) leading to a more extensive knowledge base and 
more solid technological capabilities (March, 1991). In this way, the importance of 
geographical diversity comes from being exposed to a wide variety of environments, 
which increases available information with the consequent decrease in uncertainty, thus 
increasing incentives caused by existing imperfections in unfamiliar markets and 
generating a richer knowledge structure and superior technological capabilities than in 
purely national companies (Kim et al., 1993; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). This 
geographical diversity increases the profitability of innovations and reduces their risk, 
something that stimulates R&D and more innovation. Finally, these superior   12
technological capabilities are associated with a propensity towards greenfield 
investment as opposed to adding subsidiaries through acquisition when existing 
companies in the host market have few technological capabilities or when it is difficult 
or impossible to transfer them into the acquired company due to organisational inertia 
(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). 
The institutional context approach coincides with the above in that it proposes 
that companies with superior levels of multinational experience prefer greenfield 
investment (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Madhok, 1998), due to the fact that more 
internationally experienced companies develop clearly differentiated national 
organisational routines, which are easily transferable to other countries through 
greenfield investments (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). Conversely, less internationally 
experienced companies will be less likely to have these routines and, following their 
survival instincts, prefer acquisition as it allows them to counteract a potential loss of 
global market share with respect to the more experienced companies. It should not be 
forgotten that it is expected that the threat (and the costs) associated with a potential loss 
of global market share of less experienced companies will be greater than the additional 
costs of assimilating new routines in the general corporative system, in the case of an 
acquisition (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). 
Along the same lines, from transaction costs theory, companies with greater 
multinational experience accumulate a large amount of knowledge on foreign market 
conditions and are, probably, more reluctant to pay the premium of acquisition as a way 
of reducing uncertainty and the risk associated with the foreign environment (Zejan, 
1990). Therefore, less international experience encourages risk reduction through the 
acquisition of existing companies but discourages the greenfield investment. However, 
Caves and Mehra (1986) find the opposite, i.e. that companies with more international 
experience have greater preference for acquisitions than for the creation of wholly 
owned subsidiaries, which is explained because greater international experience allows 
a company to take on the risk associated with an acquisition and integrate the foreign 
acquired company, whose managers have different nationalities (Cho and 
Padmanabhan, 1995; Kogut and Singh, 1988). To be more precise, a greater 
predisposition towards acquisitions comes from a concurrence of factors that simplify 
the subsequent integration into companies with a greater multinational character (López 
and García, 1998a). These companies have accumulated experience of managing 
foreign units and have routines for transferring their distinctive abilities (Hennart and 
Reddy, 1997; Caves and Mehra, 1986), which allows the subsequent integration of the   13
acquired company (López and García, 1998a). To sum up, the lack of consensus leads 
us to propose the two following competitive hypotheses: 
H5a: The greater the investing company’s international experience, the greater 
the probability of entry through greenfield investment. 
H5b: The greater the investing company’s international experience, the greater 
the probability of entry through acquisition. 
v) Host country experience 
The research of mergers and acquisitions debates the problems of integrating the 
newly acquired unit (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987), and proposes that investors with 
less previous host country experience are afraid of post-acquisition management 
problems, given that the acquired unit will have its own management culture and could 
have difficulty integrating with the acquiring company. Therefore, Barkema et al. 
(1996), Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) and Hennart and Park (1993) propose a 
positive relationship between host country experience and probability of entry through 
acquisition (and negative with subsidiary creation), given that the company could learn 
to manage acquisition from its previous local experience. Conversely, the transaction 
costs theory proposes that a company with little host country experience can incur high 
costs from its lack of knowledge of the host market. This knowledge shortage can be 
rectified through acquisition (but not through subsidiary creation), as the investor 
company buys a team of local managers who know how to operate in the local economy 
and have valuable information (Hennart and Park, 1993), which, in the future, will 
reduce transaction costs. To sum up, due to the lack of consensus, we propose the 
following two competitive hypotheses: 
H6a: The greater the investing company’s host country experience, the greater 
the probability of entry through greenfield investment. 
H6b: The greater the investing company’s host country experience, the greater 
the probability of entry through acquisition. 
vi) Company size 
Economic theory shows that company size is a relevant characteristic of 
companies that invest abroad, as it makes them more able to assume the risks associated 
with the decision to move outside national borders, as well as allowing economies of   14
scale to come into play (Lall, 1980). Therefore, it can be expected that the choice of 
diversification mode is often determined by the skills or resources a company has for 
facilitating international expansion (Erramilli and Rao, 1993). However, literature 
shows serious discrepancies with respect to its influence on diversification mode. On 
the one hand, the theory of the growth of the company (Penrose, 1959) accepts that the 
availability of sufficient human resources on the part of the parent company favours 
entry through greenfield investment, while a lack of personnel restricts the capacity to 
make a greenfield investment and encourages expansion by acquisition because 
acquired companies supply their own decision makers (Hennart and Park, 1993). Along 
this line, and also bearing in mind the company’s cultural context, Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995) link parent company size with greenfield investment because: i) a 
large company is more likely to have the necessary resources to successfully carry out 
international expansion than a small one, which will be more interested in obtaining 
these resources through the acquisition of other companies; and ii) a large company, 
interested in maintaining a global market share, will prefer a greenfield investment, 
which would facilitate the application of nationally developed organisational routines. 
On the other hand, Caves and Mehra (1986) and Kogut and Singh (1988) 
indicate that an acquisition requires more resources than a greenfield investment, so that 
a parent company with large assets is more likely to have the necessary financial 
resources to carry out an acquisition. In the same way, Andersson and Svensson (1994), 
from the transaction costs theory, relate company size with the accumulation of 
organisational ability (which can be separated from the organisation), and this ability 
with greater preference for entry through acquisition (and less for subsidiary creation). 
In any case, the ambiguity surrounding the influence of company size on diversification 
mode has led us to propose the two following competitive hypotheses:  
H7a: The greater the investing company size, the greater the probability of entry 
through greenfield investment. 
H7b: The greater the investing company size, the greater the probability of entry 
through acquisition.   15
  B. Country-level factors 
i) Cultural distance 
Literature offers no consensus on the impact of the cultural distance between the 
investing company’s home country and the host country. From the point of view of the 
culture of the host market, Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) explore the influence of this 
dimension on the choice of diversification mode concluding that national culture is an 
indicator of a country’s level of risk and that cultural differences act by 
increasing/reducing effectiveness when employing the specific advantages of a 
company in a certain location (Dunning, 1993). In this way, a small cultural distance 
between the two countries means that companies perceive lower risk levels and opt for 
entry through greenfield investment (but not through acquisition) in order to maximise 
the specific advantages of the company (Yip, 1982; Chatterjee, 1990). 
Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) assume the opposite, taking as a starting point the 
proposal of Kogut and Singh (1988) which combines the cultural approach with the 
institutional context of the company. Their basic approach is that cultural differences 
influence the perception of decision makers on the costs and uncertainties of foreign 
entry mode alternatives, thus creating different organisational policies, management 
routines and employee expectations. They propose that, when a company enters a 
foreign market with a very different cultural context, it is more likely to expand through 
greenfield investment (but not through acquisition), as, in this way, it can more easily 
apply organisational routines developed in the home country
11. To sum up, given the 
lack of consensus, we propose the two following competitive hypotheses: 
H8a: The greater the cultural distance between the host country and the home 
country, the greater the probability of entry through greenfield investment. 
H8b: The greater the cultural distance between the host country and the home 
country, the greater the probability of entry through acquisition. 
                                                 
11 This proposal supports that of Madhok (1998) in the field of business capabilities as competitive advantage in the 
institutional context theory.   16
ii) Level of development of host country 
The level of development of the host country is a highly important factor in the 
choice of diversification mode because, as well as reflecting the economic level of a 
country, it can also constitute an indication of restrictions to foreign investment and of 
the perception that the investing company may have of the risk of the country (these last 
two possibilities are more common in countries with low levels of development). In this 
line, and following the transaction costs theory, the more developed the host country, 
the easier it will be to find companies which meet the necessary requirements for 
acquisition (Zejan, 1990), which was evidenced by Davidson (1982). This means that, 
in a developed country there will be more well run companies whose acquisition would 
imply lower costs of incorporation into the parent company’s system and that it can, 
therefore, be a candidate for an acquisition (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). 
Alternatively, this preference could reflect the greater restrictions on foreign investment 
in less developed countries. Because of this, restrictive policies in less developed 
countries make the creation of subsidiaries more probable than acquisitions. Therefore, 
we propose: 
H9: The more developed the host country, the greater the probability of entry 
through acquisition.  
iii) Growth rate of host country  
The cultural context considers the economic characteristics of the host country in 
terms of its growth in order to define the potential benefits and risks associated with a 
specific market entry mode (Dunning, 1993; Agarwal and Ramaswami; 1992). In 
particular, in the cultural context, Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) explain the link 
between diversification mode and host market growth through two aspects which are 
also considered by the research of mergers and acquisitions (Hennart and Park, 1993): i) 
the costs of opportunity deriving from investing either sooner or later in the target 
market; and ii) growth in the capacity of local production. From the point of view of 
growth in the capacity of local production, in markets with rapid growth there is room 
to increase production capacity through the creation of new subsidiaries (Zejan, 1990; 
Andersson and Svensson, 1994). In markets with slow growth (usually advanced 
economies) there is not enough room to expand capacity but opportunities could arise to 
acquire weaker competitors. In light of this, a company may opt for entry through 
acquiring a local company because this does not increase the capacity of the industry 
and reduces the likelihood of retaliations from competitors (Brouthers and Brouthers,   17
2000). However, the perspective of costs of opportunity assumes the opposite. In 
markets with rapid growth (more common in undeveloped countries) the costs of 
opportunity will be very high (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Park, 1993), so that 
a company would prefer entry through acquisition because this would allow it to benefit 
from current opportunities as well as quickly obtain a market share (Andersson and 
Svensson, 1994; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). To sum up, the influence of growth rate 
of host country on diversification mode is ambiguous so we propose the two following 
competitive hypotheses: 
H10a: The greater the growth rate of the host country, the greater the 
probability of entry through greenfield investment. 
H10b: The greater the growth rate of the host country, the greater the 
probability of entry through acquisition. 
2.2.  Hypotheses relative to diversification mode and ownership structure 
(wholly-owned subsidiary, joint venture, full acquisition and partial 
acquisition) 
  A) Company-level factors 
i) R&D intensity 
The research line which combines diversification mode and ownership structure 
links, from the analysis of transaction costs, R&D intensity (high level of development 
of distinctive abilities) with the creation of wholly-owned subsidiaries (but not with 
acquisitions or joint-ventures), as the company does not need external resources for the 
FDI and controls the transfer of abilities from the parent company to the subsidiary 
(López and García, 1998a). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3b: The greater the investing company’s R&D intensity, the greater the 
probability of entry through wholly-owned subsidiary. 
ii) Advertising intensity 
The research line which combines diversification mode and ownership structure 
relates, in the area of transaction costs, advertising intensity (high development of 
distinctive abilities) with the creation of wholly owned subsidiaries (but not with 
acquisitions or joint ventures), as the company does not need external resources for the   18
FDI and controls the transfer of abilities from the parent company to the subsidiary 
(López and García, 1998a). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H4c: The greater the investing company’s advertising intensity, the greater the 
probability of entry through wholly-owned subsidiary. 
iii) Host country experience 
The research line which combines diversification mode and ownership structure 
proposes, from the transaction costs theory, that lack of target market knowledge 
implies lower propensity towards the creation of wholly owned subsidiaries (and greater 
propensity towards acquisitions and joint ventures) as this knowledge is usually 
accessible through the acquisition of another company which does have it and through 
the creation of joint ventures where the company combines its distinctive abilities with 
those of its partners in a third entity in which both parties participate. In this way, a lack 
of host country experience justifies the additional costs of investment through 
cooperation with a partner (costs of not collecting 100% of the profits and the risk of 
diffusing its abilities) or through the acquisition of a company (management costs 
deriving from the integration of the new company into the structure of the acquiring 
company and from the fact that it can acquire more assets than is necessary) (López and 
García, 1998a). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H6c: The greater the investing company’s host country experience, the greater 
the probability of entry through wholly-owned subsidiary. 
  B. Country-level factors 
i) Cultural distance 
The proposal of Kogut and Singh (1988) and Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) 
analyses both, the cultural context of the market and the institutional context of the 
company, through the line of research which combines diversification mode and 
ownership structure. In their opinion, faced with large cultural distance, greenfield 
investment allows a company to impose the management style of the home country and 
preserves the advantages of total ownership control. This avoids integration costs 
(which especially occur when adjusting the management practices and personnel 
characteristics of a locally acquired company) and conflicts deriving from shared 
ownership (manifested in joint-ventures with local companies). Therefore, we propose 
the following hypothesis:   19
H8c: The greater the cultural distance between the host country and the home 
country, the greater the probability of entry through wholly owned subsidiary. 
3. Research  design 
The methodology employed to reach our objectives is organised in the following 
stages: i) Test of the hypotheses relative to the determinants of the diversification mode 
(acquisition versus greenfield investment) by maximum likelihood of binomial logit 
models
12, following the proposals of Zejan (1990), Hennart and Park (1993), Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995), Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), and Brouthers and Brouthers 
(2000), among others; and ii) Test of the hypotheses relative to the determinants of the 
four alternatives of the FDI (full acquisition, partial acquisition, wholly-owned 
subsidiary and joint venture) through the estimation of a multinomial logit, in line with 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) and López and García (2002a). These specifications 
allow us to find the probability of an entry mode as a function of a set of independent 
qualitative and quantitative variables. 
This methodological process is developed for the case of Spanish FDIs between 
1998 and 2000. At a worldwide level, this time period is characterised because 
multinational companies (63.000 parent companies with around 690.000 foreign 
subsidiaries and a large number of companies linked for various reasons) cover 
practically every country and economic activity in the world economy (UNCTAD, 
2000). Moreover, this temporal horizon is part of a larger, 20 year, period that was 
marked by a large increase in multinationals. The gross product associated with 
international production and sales of foreign subsidiaries worldwide have increased 
more rapidly than the world GNP and exports respectively (UNCTAD, 2000). This 
expansion of international production has been facilitated by the introduction of 
important legislative changes. Of the 1035 law changes which apply, at a worldwide 
level, to FDI during the period 1991-1999, 94% created a more favourable situation 
(UNCTAD, 2000).  
                                                 
12 A possible alternative would be to work with a probit model in which we assume normal distribution of the error 
term, as opposed to the logit model which supposes a logistical distribution for the error term. In any case, a previous 
empirical analysis arrives at very similar conclusions with both models.   20
On the other hand, Spanish companies have not been distanced from the 
globalisation process, although they started, in the 60s and 70s, from a position of 
scarce presence in international markets compared to other European countries (Campa 
y Guillen, 1999). In fact, the story of Spanish FDIs starts in the 1970s, with their most 
important objectives being the following: 1) to guarantee the supply of certain raw 
materials; 2) to create their own distribution channels for the commercialisation of 
certain products; 3) to carry out construction and engineering projects; and 4) to 
establish financial branches (Campa and Guillén, 1996). Their real consolidation did not 
arrive before Spain’s entry into the European Union (EU) in 1986. This event 
accelerated the internationalisation of Spanish companies and produced a notable 
increase in commerce and two-way direct investment between Spain and the EU 
(Durán, 1999). However, 1993 saw the start of the period of greatest FDI expansion and 
the highest degree of multinationalisation of Spanish companies. In this period it is 
observed a different geographical configuration of the FDI, although still dominated by 
Spanish FDIs in Latin America as had been happening until Spain joined the EU 
(Durán, 1999). In any case, Spanish companies have been characterised by their reduced 
international presence due, among other reasons, to the late liberalisation of FDIs in 
Spain, which has contributed to Spain being thought of as a late investor or a nation 
whose volume of FDIs does not correspond to its level of economic development 
(López and García, 1998a). 
As far as sample selection is concerned, it can be said that the distinct origin and 
destination of direct investments has been a subject of discussion among researchers. 
Some studies analyse entries into a single country (USA for Caves and Mehra, 1986, 
and Kogut and Singh, 1988) from companies with origins in various foreign countries; 
while other studies are centred on companies coming from only one country (Sweden 
for Zejan, 1990, and Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Japan for Cho and Padmanabhan, 
1995, and for Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; and the Netherlands for Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998) which enter into a multiple countries. However, Hennart and Park 
(1993) criticise both tendencies for the following reasons: i) the first tendency 
(companies from various countries entering one country) presents great difficulties in 
modelling parent company strategies as collecting comparable data on companies 
registered in different countries differs according to accounting rules and reporting 
requirements; ii) the second group of studies (investments with one origin and various 
destinations) models parent company strategies with data from the investor’s industry or 
from the entry industry, which makes it difficult to separate the impact of parent 
company strategies from those of the host-industry. In order to avoid these problems,   21
Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) and Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) hold that investor 
companies’ origins should be the same to avoid the different behavioural norms of each 
country, and to affirm that the multiplicity of destinations in the same sample can be 
controlled through the inclusion of certain variables referring to the characteristics of 
the different host-countries. Following this proposal, our study examines direct 
investments made by Spanish companies in various other countries, which also avoids a 
drastic reduction to the sample associated with the use of only one destination of 
Spanish foreign investment. 
Obtaining the object population of the study involved the construction of a 
database from news items on Spanish FDIs published in two newspapers: Expansión 
and Cinco Días
13, which follows the approach of López and García (1998a,b). The lack 
of information on a large number of sectors led us to choose companies from the 
manufacturing industry. In other words, those whose activities are in divisions 15 to 37 
of the CNAE-93
14, excluding 23 (industrial activities relating to oil refinement and fuel 
treatments). The final sample is composed of 252 FDIs made by 141 Spanish companies 
in 45 foreign countries during the three-year period 1998-2000. This is subdivided into 
105 (41.66%) foreign entries through acquisition (of which 44 involve only one 
company and the remaining 61 involve shared ownership of the acquired company) and 
147 (58.34%) entries through greenfield investment (of which 103 are wholly-owned 
subsidiaries and 44 joint ventures). Table 1 shows the temporal distribution of the FDIs 
by entry mode. 
                                                 
13 The use of the Spanish economic press as an information source offers the following advantages (Suárez-Zuloaga, 
1995): i) the strong competition between economic publications to provide news causes them to publish even small 
operations; ii) the small number of stock market quoted companies makes it important to follow non-quoted 
companies’ investments, which represent a large proportion of the total; iii) the reduced international presence of 
Spanish companies allows publication of news of all significant international transactions; and iv) international 
databases which cover the Spanish market only make reference to the more important companies. The most important 
inconvenience is that the information given by companies can be incomplete or lack detail which may be reflected in 
newspapers. 
14 The industries analysed are: meat; food and tobacco; drinks; textiles; leather and shoes; timber; paper; publishing 
and graphic arts; chemicals; rubber and plastic products; non-metallic mineral products; metallurgy; metal products; 
machinery and metal equipment; office equipment, computer equipment, process equipment, optics and similar; 
electric and electronic machinery and material; motor vehicles; other transport materials; furniture and other 
manufacturing industries.   22
Table 1. Time distribution of the FDIs  
  Greenfields Acquisitions 
  Wholly-owned 
subsidiaries  Joint ventures Full acquisitions Partial acquisitions 
Total
Year  No.  %  No.  % No. % No. %  No.
1998  36 35.0  17 38.6 9 20.5 21 34.4  83
1999  31 30.0  8 18.2 17 38.6 22 36.0  78
2000  36 35.0  19 43.2 18 40.9 18 29.6  91
Total 103 100  44 100 44 100 61 100  252
 
With regard to the definition of the determinant variables of entry mode, we 
include the following: 
a)  Dependent variables. i) Diversification mode in a foreign market. This is 
measured with a dummy variable which assigns 1 if the Spanish company 
makes an acquisition, and 0 if it is a greenfield investment (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1988; Hennart and Park, 1993; Caves and Mehra, 1986; Cho and 
Padmanabhan, 1995; Zejan, 1990; Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Brouthers 
and Brouthers, 2000); and ii) Diversification mode and ownership structure. 
This is measured with a dependent variable with four categories, which takes 
a value of 1 when the FDI is made through the wholly-owned subsidiary 
(omitted category), 2 in cases of creation of a joint venture, 3 in cases of full 
acquisition of a company previously located in the host market and, 4 for an 
investment through a partial acquisition of a local company’s equity 
(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; López and García, 1998a)  
b)  Independent variables. i) Degree of Product Diversification. Measurement 
methods vary among studies. Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) use an entropy 
measure based on the percentage sales of each product line, while Zejan 
(1990) and Hennart and Park (1993) apply Herfindahl’s index, based on sales 
quotas for each product line; Caves and Mehra (1986), Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998), and Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) use the number of 2-
digit SIC industries in which the parent company operates throughout the 
world. Our work follows the last proposal using the information available 
from the database of SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos), due to 
the lack of information on sales percentages broken down according to 
product lines.   23
ii) Product Relatedness. Most studies opt to compare the SIC classification 
of the subsidiary’s industry and that of the parent company, in order to 
determine if the diversification is related or not (Zejan, 1990; Hennart and 
Park, 1993; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Alternatively, Pantzalis (2001) proposes the 
ratio of “related diversification divided by the sum of related and unrelated 
diversification”, defining related diversification as the number of 4-digit SIC 
industries within the company’s main 2-digit SIC industry; and unrelated 
diversification as the number of 2-digit SIC industries outside the company’s 
main 2-digit SIC industry. The lack of information on the industry 
identification codes of Spanish subsidiaries has led us to apply the approach 
of Pantzalis using information from the SABI database.  
iii) R&D Intensity. The traditional measurement of this variable is the ratio 
of R&D expenditures over total company sales (Hennart and Park, 1993; 
Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000). However, lack of information on this led Rabanal (2001) 
to propose as a proxy
15 the ratio “R&D expenditures/sales” obtained as an 
average value of the industry of the company in the year of entry and 
distinguishing according to company size (companies with a workforce of 
more than 200, and companies with between 10 and 200 workers), as it 
constitutes a measurement of “technological differentiation” which can be 
extended to subsidiaries with insignificant costs. This gives the company 
certain technological advantages, which would be exploited internally. Our 
study considers the last option due to the lack of information on the R&D 
expenditures of each company. The data used to construct this variable was 
obtained from the “Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales” carried out by 
Programa de Investigaciones Económicas of FUNEP and the Ministerio de 
Ciencia y Tecnología. 
iv) Advertising Intensity. Hennart and Park (1993) use the ratio “advertising 
expenditures/total company sales”. The lack of information on advertising 
                                                 
15 In the case of Spain, there is also the dummy variable, a proxy used by López and García (1998a), which takes a 
value of 1 when the investing company is among the 125 Spanish companies which invested the most in R&D in any 
of the years of their study period (according to the magazine Futuro y Mercado); and 0 otherwise.   24
expenditures in our country has led Rabanal (2001) to propose as a proxy
16 
the ratio of the average advertising expenditures over sales of the company’s 
industry in the year of entry in the foreign market and distinguishing 
according to company size (companies with a workforce of more than 200, 
and companies with between 10 and 200 workers). Following this proposal, 
we have constructed this variable from the “Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales”. 
v) International Experience. A proxy variable for international experience 
which has been used in empirical literature is the ratio “exports/total 
company sales” (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000); however, Slangen and 
Hennart (2001) affirm that this measurement would not be appropriate as 
certain companies, with a high export ratio, may not have any experience in 
FDI. It has also been approximated by the number of years the parent 
company has been investing abroad (Zejan, 1990; Hennart and Park, 1993). 
Given that this information is not available; our work is based on the number 
of countries in which the parent company has subsidiaries (Caves and 
Mehra, 1986; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998); 
information taken from the selected companies’ annual reports.  
vi) Host country Experience. This dimension has been measured in various 
ways in empirical literature. One of the methods used is the number of years 
that the company has been investing in the host country (Cho and 
Padmanabhan, 1995). Another group of studies (Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; and López and García, 1998a) apply the 
number of previous entries the company has made into the host country. 
Finally, Andersson and Svensson (1994) measure this variable through a 
dummy variable that assigns 1 if the company has invested previously in the 
host country and 0 if it has not. Our study follows the last approach using 
information taken from the selected companies’ annual reports. 
vii) Company Size. In general, larger companies have more resources. In 
order to account for the availability of resources and economies of scale at a 
corporative level, studies use company size measured by volume of assets of 
                                                 
16In the case of Spain there is also the dummy variable, a proxy used by López and García (1998a), which takes a 
value of 1 when the investor company is among the 200 Spanish companies which invested most in advertising in any 
of the study years, (according to the magazine IPMARK) and 0 otherwise.   25
the investor company (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Cho and Padmanabhan, 
1995; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998), or by the company’s total turnover 
(Andersson and Svensson, 1994). Our study applies the first of these, using 
information taken from the SABI database.  
viii) Cultural Distance between the home country (Spain) and the different 
host-countries. The majority of studies (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; 
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; and Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000) have 
taken this variable from the index of Kogut and Singh (1988), which is based 
on the four cultural dimensions (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity/femininity and individualism)
17 of Hofstede (1980)
18. Kogut and 
Singh’s index (1988) is defined as the average of the deviations of each 
country with respect to that of Spain (SP) in each of the four Hofstede 
dimensions (1980) corrected by the variance of each index. In algebraic 
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Where Iij is the index of the cultural dimension i in country j, Vi is the 
variance of the index of the dimension i, and CDj is the cultural distance 
between country j and Spain. Following this proposal, our study applies the 
index data, obtained from Hofstede (1991), to the four cultural dimensions in 
each country
19.  
                                                 
17 Power distance is defined as the extent to which differences in wealth and other privileges are accepted as 
legitimate or illegitimate. Uncertainty avoidance is the degree of discomfort felt about ambiguity and the unknown. 
Masculinity/femininity refers to values such as heroism, assertiveness, material success, modesty, care of the weak 
and interpersonal harmony. Finally, Individuality is the degree of social and interpersonal connection. 
18 An alternative measurement of cultural distance is found in the study of López and García (1998a), which defines 
three dummy variables to place countries into three internally homogeneous geographical areas from the cultural 
and/or economic point of view (OECD countries not in the EU, non-OECD countries except Latin America and Latin 
America). 
19 However, Hofstede’s data is based on 66 countries which do not include countries which are very important for 
Spanish direct investment such as Morocco and Cuba, among others. As a proxy of these countries and following the 
procedure used by Erramilli (1991) and Ramón (2000), we use the indexes of the most culturally similar countries. 
For example, for Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco we use the Hofstede value (1991) for the Arabic countries. To prevent 
these assimilations from distorting our results we estimate another binomial logit model, reducing the number of 
observations by eliminating the FDIs in countries which do not have a Hofstede cultural variable. The obtained 
results essentially corroborate the conclusions reached.    26
ix) Level of Development of the Host country. This is often reflected by the 
per capita GNP of the host country in the investment year (Andersson and 
Svensson, 1994; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Zejan, 1990) as this 
measurement can be indicative of the economic and technical situation in 
which local companies operate (Zejan, 1990). Conversely, authors such as 
Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) apply a proxy of a dummy variable according 
to the annual classification made by the World Bank. Our study uses the first 
alternative with information from the World Economic Outlook (2001).  
x) Growth Rate of the Host country. This is taken from the increase in the 
GNP of the host country in the investment year (Zejan, 1990; Andersson and 
Svensson, 1994; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) or from the average 
industrial growth in five years (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Our study 
uses the first alternative with information from the World Economic Outlook 
(2001).  
Finally, as control variables, we consider the following: i) Leverage. This is 
measured by the ratio between long term debt and the market value of the parent 
company (Hennart and Park, 1993; Chatterjee, 1990); information obtained from the 
SABI database; ii) Returns on Equity of the parent company, as a proxy for firm 
profitability (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998); information taken from the SABI 
database; iii) Ownership structure of the subsidiary, from a dummy variable where 1 
implies that the parent company owns 95% or more, and 0 if it does not (Hennart and 
Park, 1993; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998), information obtained from companies’ 
annual reports. 
4. Results  obtained 
4.1.  Determinant factors of the choice “acquisition versus greenfield” 
In order to test the hypotheses corresponding to this choice, we estimate various 
binomial logit models, which regress diversification mode (acquisition versus 
greenfield) with the variables discussed in section 3 (Table 3). The descriptive statistic 
of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of 252 news items on FDIs 
relating to 141 Spanish companies is found in Table 2.   27
Table 2. Descriptive Statistic 
      Correlation Coefficients 
Variables   Mean  St. Dev  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10  11 12
Acquisition  0.42 0.49         
1. Product Div  3.63 1.88         
2. Related Div  0.63 0.22  -0.44
a     
3. R&D Intensity  1.21 1.38  0.10  -0.21
a     
4. Advertising Int   2.61 2.37  -0.32
a  0.11 -0.15
b     
5. International Exper   5.13 4.07  0.30
a  -0.14
b  0.01 0.02    
6. Host country Exp  0.49 0.50  0.05  -0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.29
a     
7. Company Size  48251.9 79064.2 0.34
a  -0.17
a  -0.10 -0.06 0.51
a  0.25
a     
8. Cultural Distance  0.94 0.62  0.03  -0.07 0.13
b  0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.06    
9. H-C Development  10492.1 10800.4  0.02  0.02 0.13
b  -0.10 0.07 0.16
b  -0.09 0.23
a    
10. H-C Growth Rate  3.26 3.04  -0.12  0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.35
a  -0.01  
11. Leverage  52.89 17.53  -0.03  -0.06 0.15
b  0.15
b  -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 0.07 -0.07  0.00 
12. Returns on Equity  11.72 14.39  0.02  -0.07 0.00 -0.13
b  0.03 -0.05 -0.10 0.09 -0.06  0.11 -0.02
13. Ownership  0.41 0.49  -0.02  -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.11 0.15
b  -0.02 -0.28
a  0.02 0.03 0.02
a= prob<0.01; b= prob<0.05; c= prob<0.1 
 
An earlier analysis of the Condition Index and that of the matrix of correlations 
between the variables (Greene, 1999) shows the presence of certain multicollinearity, 
whose impact on the final results is limited by selecting non-linear independent 
dimensions. Thus, the equations shown (Table 3) constitute different combinations of 
the variables, designed to collectively solve the problem of multicollinearity. 
In general, the equations of the binomial logit models present high levels of 
global significance, which seems to show that decision maker behaviour is found in the 
function specifications of this modelization. Likewise, more than 67 percent of sample 
observations are correctly classified for all equations. The significance tests of the 
individual parameters show that the variables of related diversification, international 
experience, cultural distance, size and ownership structure have the most influence over 
the choice of diversification mode (greenfield versus acquisition), being statistically 
significant in all the equations at a level below 5% (Table 3). However, advertising 
intensity, host country experience and level of development of host country are 
statistically significant in some of the equations, at a level below 10%, and are not 
significant in others. Consequently, the first five dimensions (related diversification, 
international experience, cultural distance, size and ownership structure) constitute the 
determinant variables of the modelization. Likewise, the high significance of the control   28
 
Table 3. Binomial logit of the determinant factors of diversification mode: acquisition 
versus greenfield (acquisition = 1) (Standard errors in brackets) 
  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5  Equation 6
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% Correct Predictions  68.07  74.37  67.65  74.37  73.85  75.69 
a= prob<0.01; b= prob<0.05; c= prob<0.1 
 
                                                 
20 The reduction in the number of observations with respect to the sample taken for this study is due to the need to 
consider news items on FDIs which include information on all the variables considered.   29
variable “Ownership” shows the importance of a simultaneous analysis of the impact of 
company and host country factors on entry mode according to ownership structure, 
which is carried out at the section 4.2 with multinomial logit models (Table 4).  
A detailed examination of the hypotheses shows, firstly, the lack of significance 
of the coefficients of product diversification squared, which shows the non-linear 
relationship between product diversification and diversification mode, which does not 
allow us to support this relationship, according to the learning organisation theory. In 
addition, product diversification is also not significant in any of the equations that test 
its linear relationship with diversification mode. Therefore, there is no sufficient 
statistical basis from which to make conclusions on hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c. 
Despite this, its negative sign seems to show a negative linear tendency between 
product diversification and entry through acquisition, in line with Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995). Related diversification shows a positive sign, statistically 
significant at a level below 5% (Table 3), which shows that diversification towards 
similar business is linked with entry through acquisition; which proves hypothesis H2b, 
in line with the proposal of Hennart and Park (1993), supporting the theory of mergers 
and acquisitions, and in agreement with the results obtained by Brouthers and Brouthers 
(2000).  
The coefficient of the variable R&D intensity is not significant in any of the 
equations of Table 3, which means that we cannot make any conclusions on hypothesis 
H3. This could be explained by Caves and Mehra (1986) who do not predict a clear 
direction of influence: i) acquisition can represent an attractive entry route into an 
industry with a high level of R&D if the research capacity of the local company allows 
the parent company to adapt its technological assets to the local market, or if the parent 
company lacks the appropriate technology and expects to make great use of the acquired 
company’s stock; ii) multinationals in high R&D industries often transfer their 
technology so they do not need to acquire the technological stock of a local company. In 
any case, this result differs from that obtained by López and García (1998a) in Spain 
between 1988 and 1994, where R&D is significant and is associated with fully owned 
subsidiaries. This difference in the results of the two studies could be because the 
variables used to measure technological intensity are based on different proxies (see 
section 3). Advertising intensity does not present robust results given the lack of 
significance in three equations and the fact that it is only significant at 10% in two other 
equations and at 5% in another (Table 3), showing that there is no conclusive evidence   30
for hypotheses H4a and H4b, in line with the proposal of Caves and Mehra (1986) of 
lack of consensus on this causal relationship. 
The positive and significant sign at a level below 5% of the variable 
International Experience (Table 3) indicates that it is associated with the probability of 
entry through acquisition and therefore, proves hypothesis H5b in line with Caves and 
Mehra (1986) and Kogut and Singh (1988) from transaction costs. This result also 
coincides with that found by López and García (1998a) in Spain between 1988 and 
1994. The previous host country experience of companies in FDI offer not very robust 
results as the coefficients are significant (Table 3) in four equations at levels below 10% 
and are not significant in another two equations, which prevents us from making 
conclusions on their influence. However, its positive sign seems to show a positive 
relationship between host country experience and entry through acquisition, in line with 
Barkema et al. (1996) and Hennart and Park (1993). 
Company size presents a positive and significant sign at a level below 1%, 
which reflects its influence on the propensity to invest in foreign markets through 
acquisition (Table 3). This supports hypothesis H7b from the perspective of transaction 
costs put forward by Andersson and Svensson (1994), as well as Kogut and Singh 
(1988) and Caves and Mehra (1986).  
The negative and significant sign of the variable cultural distance (Table 3) 
supports hypothesis H8b, in line with Kogut and Singh (1988) and Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995) who combine the cultural context of the host market with the 
institutional context of the company (Madhok, 1998) that considers business abilities as 
a competitive advantage. In other words, a company prefers to expand through a 
subsidiary when cultural distance is great, as it allows them to easily apply their own 
country’s organisational routines. Pla (1999) arrives at the same result in Spain. 
Host country development does not present robust results given the lack of 
significance in one equation, being significant in the rest (Table 3), showing that there is 
no conclusive evidence for hypothesis H9. However, its positive sign is as expected, 
showing a positive relationship between the per capita GNP of the host country in the 
investment year and the probability of entry through the acquisition of a local company, 
in line with Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) from the transaction costs theory. It can be 
shown, in this respect, that Durán and Úbeda (2001) prove, in line with López and 
García (1997), that the principal cause of investment in non-OCDE countries by 
Spanish companies is the creation of productive subsidiaries. The coefficient of host   31
country growth rate is not statistically significant in any of the equations of Table 3, in 
line with Andersson and Svensson (1994). Therefore, we cannot make any conclusions 
on any of the arguments put forward by hypotheses H10a and H10b.  
The control variable of leverage is not significant in any of the equations of 
Table 3, which means that we cannot conclude anything on its impact on diversification 
mode, as in the study of Hennart and Park (1993). These authors explain the result by 
the idiosyncrasies of the capital markets of the home and host countries (companies may 
have good and long lasting relationships with banks in some countries, which allows 
them to easily finance FDIs, while in other countries it could be that they do not have 
strong relationships with banks making it difficult to finance FDIs), which suggests that 
strategic variables have a greater impact on entry mode than financial dimensions. In 
any case, the negative sign (Table 3) could mean that companies with heavy debt could 
continue financing subsidiary creation through banks if they maintain a long 
relationship with them and exchange a large volume of information with them (Hennart 
and Park, 1993). In the same way, the control variable returns on equity is not 
significant in any of the equations of Table 3, but its positive sign could be an indication 
that decision makers in very profitable companies allocate their financial resources to 
acquiring other companies in order to increase their own power, prestige and salary, 
even when these acquisitions do not increase the value of the company (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998). 
4.2.  Determinant factors of the choice between “wholly-owned subsidiary, 
joint venture, full acquisition and partial acquisition” 
With the object of testing the hypotheses on the determinants of the options 
resulting from combining diversification mode and ownership structure, we estimate a 
multinomial logit model, which regresses the four FDI options shown in section 3. 
Likewise, among the independent variables that have been explained in section 2.2, we 
include the host country development, in line with Padmanabhan and Cho (1999), 
insofar as preliminary tests indicate that its consideration improves the significance of 
the multinomial logit and of the individual parameters. 
In general, the equations of the multinomial logit models show high levels of 
global significance, which seems to show that decision-making behaviour is found in 
the functional specifications of this modelization. The significance tests for the 
individual parameters demonstrate that the variables of advertising intensity, host 
country experience, cultural distance and host country development have the most   32
influence on entry mode, being robust in the equations (Table 4). Conversely, 
technological intensity is not significant in any of the equations. Consequently, the 
dimensions of advertising intensity, host country experience, cultural distance and host 
country development are the determinant variables of the modelization. 
The detailed examination of the research hypotheses shows, firstly, the lack of 
significance of the coefficients of R&D intensity, meaning that we cannot make 
conclusions on hypothesis H3b. It can be said that section 4.1 also detects the lack of 
significance of this dimension (Table 3), which is explained by Caves and Mehra (1986) 
in the same section. However, this result differs from that obtained by López and García 
(2002a) in Spain between 1988 and 1996, where R&D intensity is significant and 
associated with entry through acquisition (full or partial) as opposed to wholly-owned 
subsidiary. This difference between the results of the two studies could be due to the 
variables used to measure R&D intensity being based on two different proxies (see 
section 3). 
Table 4. Multinomial logit of the determinant factors of entry mode and ownership 
structure decision (standard errors in brackets) 












































































Number of Observations  240 
Log Likelihood  -281.11 
Chi-Squared  72.06
a 
% Correct Predictions   44.0 
a= prob<0.01; b= prob<0.05; c= prob<0.1 
Note: the omitted category is “wholly-owned subsidiary”
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For its part, the detailed analysis of advertising intensity, bearing in mind the 
combination of diversification mode and ownership structure, shows a significant 
positive sign at a level below 1% in the joint venture model and a negative sign at 5% in 
the partial acquisition model. Therefore, advertising intensity is associated with a 
greater probability of joint ventures (as opposed to wholly-owned subsidiary) and with 
wholly-owned subsidiary (as opposed to partial acquisition). In particular, these results 
do not support hypothesis H4c of a positive association between advertising intensity 
and wholly-owned subsidiary. In this way, López and García (1998a) indicate that 
unexpected behaviour is often more frequent in studies of non-USA companies 
(Hennart, 1991; Kogut and Singh, 1988). 
The examination of host country experience shows a negative sign significant at 
a level below 1% in the joint venture model, and a positive sign significant at 5% in the 
partial acquisition model. Therefore, host country experience is associated with greater 
probability of wholly-owned subsidiary (as opposed to joint venture) and with partial 
acquisition (as opposed to wholly-owned subsidiary). To be precise, these results do not 
allow us to support hypothesis H6c of a positive association between host country 
experience and wholly-owned subsidiary. These results complement those found in 
section 4.1 of lack of robustness because the negative sign of the joint venture model is 
in line with the transaction costs theory (Hennart and Park, 1993; López and García, 
1998a) of hypothesis H6b of association between greater host country experience and 
greenfield investment and, in addition, the positive sign of the partial acquisition model 
is in line with the theory of mergers and acquisitions (Barkema et al., 1996; Barkema 
and Vermeulen, 1998; Hennart and Park, 1993) of hypothesis H6a of a positive 
association between host country experience and acquisition. 
The variable of cultural distance between the home and host countries has a 
negative sign, significant at 5% in the total acquisition model. This allows us to 
conclude that greater cultural distance between the home and host countries is 
associated with a greater probability of entry through wholly-owned subsidiary (as 
opposed to full acquisition), which would support hypothesis H8c, in line with Kogut 
and Singh (1988) and Chang and Ronsezweig (2001). 
The host country development shows a positive sign in the full acquisition 
model and a negative sign in the others. This leads to the conclusion that a greater host 
country development is associated with a greater probability of entry through full 
acquisition (and lesser probability through wholly-owned subsidiary) and with lesser 
probability with the options of joint venture and partial acquisition which imply sharing   34
resources (and greater with wholly-owned subsidiary). This does not allow support for 
hypothesis H9, which associates the level of development with entry through 
acquisition.  
Finally, neither of the control variables of returns on equity and leverage are 
significant, as found in section 4.1. 
5. Conclusions 
The implication that the choice of foreign entry mode through FDI is explained 
by certain company and host country factors has allowed us to analyse this phenomena 
in a sample of 141 Spanish manufacturing companies between 1998 and 2000. For the 
first time, we examine firstly, the determinant factors of diversification mode 
(acquisition versus greenfield investment) considering various theories such as mergers 
and acquisitions, transaction costs, the learning organisation, the institutional context of 
the company and the cultural context of the host country; and secondly, the explanatory 
dimensions of four foreign expansion which result from combining diversification mode 
with ownership structure (full acquisition, partial acquisition, wholly-owned subsidiary 
and joint venture subsidiary). 
The methodology is based on various logit models, binomial and multinomial, to 
find out the determinant factors in the choice of foreign entry mode. The empirical 
application carried out in our country led us to conclude that, for the sample companies, 
“acquisition versus greenfield investment” choice depends mainly on related 
diversification, international experience, size and ownership structure and, to a lesser 
extent on the cultural distance between the home and host countries. Likewise, the 
choice between total acquisition, partial acquisition, wholly-owned subsidiary and joint 
venture is explained by advertising intensity, host country experience, cultural distance 
and the host country development. 
These results, taken together, confirm that the argumentations of the theories of 
transaction costs, mergers and acquisitions, and the institutional context of the company 
and the cultural context of the host market exert influence on foreign entry decisions. To 
be precise, from the transaction costs theory, we justify, firstly, acquisition as a form of 
foreign investment found as company size grows, given the implicit accumulation of 
organisational capabilities which can be separated from the organization; and secondly,   35
acquisition as a form of foreign investment found as international experience grows, as 
this allows a company to face the risk associated with an acquisition and integrate into 
the acquired foreign company whose managers have different nationalities. 
Considering the theory of mergers and acquisitions argues for the association of 
acquisition with related diversification, as the problems of post-acquisition interaction 
diminish with similarity of origin and destination. Finally, the institutional context of 
the company and the cultural context of the host country support the relationship found 
between subsidiary creation and cultural distance, arguing that creating subsidiaries in a 
country with a very different cultural context facilitates the application of the home 
country’s organisational routines. 
As future lines of research we would highlight the analysis of entry modes 
distinguishing different aspects, such as corporative strategy (Harzing, 2002), the 
existence of business networks (Pla, 1999), as well as a comparison between entry 
options such as joint venture and complete acquisition (Hennart and Reddy, 2000).   36
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